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THE CHALLENGE OF DERIVATIVES
(CONTINUED)
Saul S. Cohen
N 1986, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"),
concerned about the claimed effect of something called concen-
trated short selling (just as it is today with small order execution sys-
tem ("SOES") trading), conducted a study of the subject.' The
Executive Summary2 to that study, since it was written, has summed
up for me all that is wrong with the regulatory approach to business
problems. Among other benefits of short selling the study found:
"[S]hort selling ... [provides] day-to-day . .. liquidity to the
market."3
"Selling short enables market participants to adjust their portfolio
and risk positions in many circumstances."4
"[Short sales cause] stock prices to be more responsive to new infor-
mation and developments ...moderating wide swings in stock
prices. ' '5
"[T]ick restrictions that broadly impact all short-selling activities
may be of questionable utility. ' 6
And having reviewed the supposed worst cases of short selling
"abuse," the study found that "a valid basis existed for short selling in
most of the selected securities."7
You will have guessed that after the study, the NASD adopted, and
the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") approved, regulations
to limit short selling in the over-the-counter ("OTC") market, includ-
ing a tick-test.8
Without spending more time on this, the point I would make is that
regulation is driven by more constituencies than the business parties
involved in the transactions at issue, and those special interests flaw
regulation both in its conception and enforcement. Thus, when I last
spoke on derivatives at Fordham Law School in the fall of 1994, the
1. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Short-Sale Regulation of
NASDAQ Securities (1986). Those pressing for short sale regulation were speculative
over-the-counter ("OTC") issuers claiming that the securities of their companies were
(as noted in the report) the "targets of professional short sellers." Id. at 101. The
opposing parties were short sellers and market makers.
2. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Short-Sale Regulation of
NASDAQ Securities Executive Summary (1986).




7. Id. at 8.
8. National Association of Securities Dealers Manual Rule 3350 (1997).
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challenge of derivatives which I saw was to this sort of regulatory
extravagance. 9
It should be recalled that at that time the investing world was reel-
ing from highly publicized recent losses in, among other excitements,
the Procter & Gamble, a° Gibson Greetings," and Askin Capital Man-
agement 12  matters, with Barings, 13  Orange County, 14  and
Metallgesellschaft 15 yet to come. And it should also be recalled that
the regulatory voices were predictable and loud. SEC Chairman Lev-
itt predicted that a derivative-driven "accident" would lead to the fail-
ure of a large firm resulting in effects throughout the market.
Representative Leach pronounced that "[a] commonality of standards
[to control the risks of derivatives] cannot be achieved without legisla-
tion."' 6 And legislation was introduced into Congress in 1995 and af-
ter, including the Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives
Oversight Act of 1995, which would have created a Federal Deriva-
tives Commission."
That no broad regulation was enacted is not, I believe, due to the
voices of economists and other experts who were quickly able to as-
certain that the debacles cited above did not derive from some intrin-
sic evil of derivatives, but rather from managerial inadequacies. After
all, as I noted, economic analysis and reality did not stop the advent of
short sale regulation. Neither is the lack of broad regulation because
ultimately everyone, including regulators and legislators, understood
that the use of derivatives were simply crucial to the operation of
9. The talk led to my article, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L. Rev.
1993 (1995), which treats the onset of concerns about derivatives.
10. Procter & Gamble reported in 1994 that it had lost $157 million in interest rate
and deutsch mark swaps with Bankers Trust Securities Co. Litigation between the
two companies was eventually settled. See also infra note 39.
11. Gibson Greetings lost $23 million in 1994 in derivatives transactions with
Bankers Trust. It is believed to be the first American corporation to sue on OTC
derivatives losses. The case was settled in November 1994 with Bankers Trust ac-
cepting two-thirds of the loss. See John Connor & G. Bruce Knecht, Bankers Trust
FacingAction on Derivatives, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3. The matter also resulted
in SEC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), and Federal Reserve
investigations. See infra note 35.
12. Askin Capital Management, a hedge fund managing $2 billion, speculated in
collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs") and became the first of the 1994 deriv-
ative-related hedge fund collapses. See Floyd Norris, A Speculator Collapses, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 1994, § 3, at 1.
13. The Barings, PLC matter was extensively reported by the press in February-
March 1995. See Saul Hansell, The Collapse of Barings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1995, at
D1; see also infra note 38.
14. The Orange County, California disaster is not completely resolved. Suits
against its underwriters and others continue.
15. In re MG Refining and Marketing Inc., CFTC Docket No. 95-14 (July 27,
1995), available in 1995 WL 447455 (C.F.T.C.). See also infra note 36 and accompany-
ing text.
16. Oversight of Derivatives Moving at Acceptable Pace, Fed's Phillips Says, 26 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. 1313, 1315 (1994).
17. H.R. 20, 104th Cong. (1995).
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multi-national enterprises. Instead, the absence of broad regulation is
attributable to the prosaic facts that Barings died and (just as Drexel
Burnham) affected no one-except its owners and employees-and
that by June of 1995 interest rates had fallen and many speculative
derivative contracts entered into by institutions-such as Midwestern
State University and the State of Texas Investment Fund, important
members of the sorts of constituencies that drive Congress-profita-
bly matured.'8
Thus, the legislation before Congress today is at the margins: an
expanded Treasury amendment to include equity swaps among trans-
actions exempted from regulation,19 an effort by the banks to overturn
the Financial Accounting Standards Board's ("FASB's") draft stan-
dards of Accounting for Derivative Instruments and for Hedging Ac-
tivities,.2 and the ever popular, and never enacted, repeal of Glass-
Steagall, 1 to include derivatives sales practice regulation by the SEC
while the actual transactions remain on the books of banks. (As I
write this, I understand from a knowledgeable legislative source, that
none of the above-or the re-do of the Commodities Exchange Act
("CEA") and the creation of professional markets for various fu-
tures-will be enacted in this legislative session, if ever.) But though I
have described these proposals as marginal, two do carry, and are un-
derstood to carry, what I see as the challenge of derivatives to regula-
tion more openly than we have seen before: equity swaps and
professional markets. I would argue that these, posing the question-
regulation or no regulation in all or none terms-are as subversive to
regulation as the anarchic, democratic, information driven internet. 2
Thus, this talk seeks to explain-other than that matters have quieted
down-why broad based regulation of derivatives has not only failed
to be enacted, but rather why the pressures are toward exemptions or
exclusions of derivatives and markets from regulation, exactly at the
other end of the scale.' 3
18. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Derivatives Crisis Fades as Rates Fall, Wall St. J. (Texas),
June 7, 1995, at T3, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 872890.
19. See Equity Swaps by Banks Win Legislative Approval, Wall St. Letter, June 23,
1997, at 7 (discussing Campbell amendment). The SEC was reported to be seeking to
have the legislation "exclude" rather than "exempt" equity swaps. See Aide Outlines
Critical Decisions in Lugar Bill, Wall St. Letter, June 23, 1997, at 7.
20. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Accounting for Derivative Instru-
ments and for Hedging Activities, Sept. 12, 1997 (visited Nov. 23, 1997) <http'.l
www.fasb.org.>; see Reed Abelson, Accounting Board Proposal on Derivatives is Get-
ting Heat, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1997, at D1.
21. The House Commerce Committee bill addressing Glass-Steagall repeal was
placed on the Committee web site <http'lwww.house.govlcommerce> on Sept. 16,
1997.
22. The exponential expansion of access to the internet has raised questions as to
the efficacy of securities regulation regarding corporate information, issuance of se-
curities, execution of transactions, communications with customers, and fraud.
23. The authorization of largely unregulated professional commodities markets is
part of congressional consideration of the deregulation of the futures industry. See
1997]
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Perhaps the place to start is with risk. Transactions in derivatives
are bathed in risks generally unknown to trading in ordinary stocks
and bonds. Aside from the theoretical risk to the system referred to
above, these risks range from simple lack of understanding of the cost,
efficacy, and loss potential of the product being employed, through
the legal risk of lack of enforceability to economic risks tied to early
termination of the contract.24 The response to control of all such risks
except legality is, in narrow terms, intellectual skill or expertise and in
broad terms indirect regulation-activity and examination guidelines,
risk management, and adequacy of internal controls-and voluntary
dealer compliance, for example, the Derivatives Policy Group princi-
ples. Since we are at a law school I should spend a minute on
legality.
There are myriad potential legal theories available to the party to a
derivatives contract, normally the end-user rather than the dealer,
who seeks to avoid the effect of its agreement. Legal theories pressed
by plaintiffs include such common law causes of action or defenses as:
breach of fiduciary duty, ultra vires, inability to contract or lack of
meeting of the minds, fraud, reckless and negligent misrepresentation
and concealment, to reliance on statute and regulation, for example,
violations of not only such headline laws as the Federal Securities
Acts and the Commodity Exchange Act, but the more obscure state
blue sky laws, and the still more obscure state deceptive trade prac-
tices laws and gambling laws.26 In one commentator's imagination,
there are defenses in the implied warranty of fitness found in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, suitability theories under the rules of the var-
ious self-regulatory organizations, and even the anti-trust laws, which
contain the concept of illegal tie-in sales of one financial product with
another.27 And, of course, if all else fails, there is always RICO.
As one survey has put it: "The development of legal principles in
derivative litigation is in its infancy.... For now, the options [presum-
ably the authors intended no pun] of defrauded or misled purchasers
are limited only by the facts and the creativity of counsel.""8 Given
the parties who engage in derivatives contracts-the Minmetals29 and
Richard R. Lindsey, SEC Director of Market Regulation Division, Speaks to Deriva-
tives, Derivatives, July/Aug. 1997, at 284.
24. The risks are set out in my article, supra note 9, at 2010-13.
25. Derivatives Policy Group, Framework for Voluntary Oversight (1995).
26. See L. Clifford Craig et al., Legal Theories in Lawsuits Against Derivatives
Dealers in the Over-the-Counter Markets, 931 PLI/Corp 129 (1996).
27. Denis M. Forster, Derivative Litigation: An Overview-End-Users and Deal-
ers Liability Theories and Tactical Considerations, 931 PLI/Corp. 9 (1996).
28. Craig et al., supra note 26, at 175.
29. Lehman Bros. Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., No.
94 Civ. 8301 (JFK), 1996 WL 346426 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996).
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Rayapratama 30 cases being two examples-I would put quotations
around "defrauded" and "misled."
I have mounted this exhibition of legal theory miscellany to note
that it is but one of an array of control devices, strategies, and nar-
rowly based government enforcement actions which have taken the
place of broad-based regulation. If you imagine bullet points:
eSince Orange County, Texas has required dealers to sign letters
that their transactions with municipalities will preclude imprudent
investment activities by these local authorities. Sort of a penny
stock approach to derivative transactions.
31
oThe already mentioned guidelines, Framework for Voluntary
Oversight,32 created by six major dealers in coordination with the
New York Fed and various trade associations, is subject to contin-
ued criticism by the U.S. General Accounting Office and others,
that it has no teeth, is voluntary, and leaves many loose ends.
33
-SEC consents such as this month's Mitchell Hutchins Asset Man-
agement matter,' in which an advisor was disciplined for what ap-
pears to be a combination of losses by a government securities
mutual fund resulting from a class of derivatives which comprised
three percent of assets and the use of the common legal phrasing
that the fund had "no present intention" of investing in such deriva-
tives; or to go back two years, Gibson Greetings, which despite its
well-publicized injuries suffered in its Bankers Trust transactions,
was disciplined together with its CFO and Treasurer for failing to
report on Gibson's 10-Qs that what was intended to be an interest
rate hedge "amounted to trading or speculation," for accounting
purposes.
35
o(If I may be permitted an aside at this point, the Metallgesellschaft
case illustrates something that the public does not know and that
most practitioners have let slip to the back of their minds: That is,
consent agreements have no probative value either in civil or disci-
plinary matters. As the case noted: "[A] consent decree is not a
'true adjudication of the underlying issues.' )3b
30. P.T. Adimitra Rayapratama v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 95 Civ. 0786 (JSM),
1995 WL 495634 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1995).
31. Texas appears to be a lonely pioneer of this approach. See Tex. Gov't Code
Ann § 2256.005 (k)-(1) (West Pamphlet 1998). The failings of similar penny stock
letters have recently been described. See La Jolla Capital Barred from Sale of Penny
Stocks, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1997, at B9D.
32. See supra note 25
33. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Derivatives: Actions Taken or
Proposed Since May, 1994 (1996).
34. In re Mitchell Hutchins Asset Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 1654, 65 SEC Docket 653 (Sept. 2, 1997). available in 1997 WL 537042
(S.E.C.).
35. In re Gibson Greetings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-36357, 60 SEC
Docket 1401 (Oct. 11, 1995).
36. In re MG Refining & Marketing, Inc. Litigation, 94 Civ. 2512 (S.D.N.Y.),
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 26,956, at 44,634 (Jan. 22, 1997).
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*The need to avoid net capital rules applied by the SEC to broker-
dealers, thus twisting dealer corporate structures out of all recogniz-
able shape and, among other things, resulting in the Securities In-
dustry Association's ("SIA's") pressing of the concept of limited
purpose broker-dealers upon the SEC to accommodate this need.37
*The open-ended liability caused by hindsight analysis of what com-
prises management understanding of and internal guidelines to con-
trol a sometimes complex product, as often set forth in the sort of
generalities in the House of Commons 1995 report on the Barings
disaster.
38
*Issues of fiduciary obligations of dealers with advised counter-par-
ties, if not in suitability terms as illustrated by the federal court deci-
sion in Bankers Trust and Procter & Gamble, then in the sort of
ethical effect on public relations that large institutions, dependent
on public good will, cannot resist; not to mention the negative effect
on the careers of senior management.39
-The potpourri of less than fully convincing approaches to measure-
ment of risk as part of risk management, such as sensitivity testing,
marking to market, value at risk40 (to compute which there are itself
various methods), etc.
*And, of course, the overall concern that whatever exemptions or
exclusions from regulation of these contracts exist-if, in fact, there
are such things-will be snatched back in a regulatory minute if a
compelling enough situation comes along.41
Contemplating these examples, and especially if you are someone who
waited breathlessly two weeks ago this evening at the FASB web site
to be the first on your block to print out 135 pages of draft standards
and examples, you might say "I don't want to be pecked to death by
37. Since broker-dealers that engage in derivatives transactions are subject to SEC
net capital rules (requiring a 100% "haircut" for swaps), firms engage in such transac-
tions through unregistered affiliates. Such affiliates raise supervision, corporate man-
agement, and enterprise liability issues. The Securities Industry Association ("SIA")
in 1993 took a position supporting a less strict net capital rule. SIA now proposes the
creation of limited purpose registered broker-dealers (for example, dealers in OTC
derivatives) which would preserve regulatory oversight while relaxing net capital
rules.
38. Board of Banking Supervision, Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse
of Barings 250 (1995).
39. These considerations drive consent decrees. Soon after the Procter & Gamble,
Gibson Greetings, and Air Products & Chemicals settlements, the Chairman of Bank-
ers Trust Co. retired. See also John M. Quitmeyer, Fiduciary Obligations in the Deriv-
atives Marketplace, Secs. & Commods. Reg., Oct. 25, 1995, at 179.
40. See Kenneth S. Leong, Value-at-Risk in a Nutshell, Derivatives, July/August
1996, at 272.
41. The CFTC action in Metallgesellschaft, supra note 15, is an obvious example.
Under Congressional pressure the then Chairperson of the CFTC was forced to say
that "[t]he MG settlement had nothing to do with swaps," but rather that the enforce-
ment case "was a response to a serious failure of MG's internal controls." Joanne
Morrison, CFTC Promises Not to Regulate Swaps Like Futures, Bond Buyer, Jan. 23,
1996, at 6.
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ducks," and might then well ask: What is wrong with a single source
of all encompassing derivatives regulation?
A flip reply might be that subversion is more fun, but I would think
that by now the evidence is convincing that broad-based regulation
simply does not fit a subject as protean as derivatives. Even the direc-
tor of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation recently noted that
the SEC did not see a need for additional regulation in this area.4 2
Thus, it is likely that items from the menu of legal horrors I have pro-
vided, along with attempts to encourage, through enforcement pro-
ceedings, stronger management controls and other regulatory
guerrilla activities, will constitute whatever derivatives regulation we
are likely to see.
In fact, the movement appears to be away from regulation: Not
only have position limits been raised on the S&P indices, but position
limits were eliminated entirely last week on flex equity options.4 3
Since these "E-Flex options" are largely an institutional product (the
position limit had been 75,000 contracts or 7,500,000 shares), their
elimination makes a telling argument for the creation of exchange in-
stitutional markets, being put forward by the various non-equity ex-
changes and the Federal Reserve Board.
Think about the challenges such a professional financial futures
market poses to regulation. Since the definition of institution encom-
passes entities with as little as $1 million of net worth and individuals
with assets above $10 million, this market would have 90% of the vol-
ume and thus its quotes would lead the now shrunken, shall we say,
"amateur" market.' (By the way, this type of market is hardly a far-
fetched concept: compare Instinet to Nasdaq.)45 The market would
have no position limits or trade reporting. Its dealers would have no
suitability concerns. The question would then be: Why should the
exchange, as a self-regulator, be responsible for retail customer sales
practice regulation, made increasingly expensive without the subsidi-
zation of business from institutions?
In equal measure, the humble plain vanilla equity swap also poses
great challenges to regulation. The swap offers, in effect, 100% mar-
42. Supra note 23, at 287. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve was
reported to have said that regulation of off-exchange transactions between institu-
tions, as mandated by the CEA, is "wholly unnecessary." . . . As Swaps Dealers
Boosted by Dunn Decision, Wall St. Letter. Mar. 3, 1997, at 9.
43. See Robert McGough et al., Money Managers' Notice Board, Wall St. J. Eur.,
Sept. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 12211604.
44. The estimates appear in the Lindsey interview. Supra note 231, at 287.
45. Trades on Instinet, the leading electronic communications network, represent
a substantial portion of the Nasdaq market securities volume. The SEC order han-
dling rules adopted in 1996 address this issue in part, and a recent SEC concept re-
lease seeks advice on rationalizing the roles of electronic communications networks
("ECNs") and exchanges. See Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No.
38,672, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,942, at 89.630 (May 23, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg.
30485 (June 4, 1997).
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gin; so much for the vestigial margin rules. It can be tailored to con-
trol large amounts of a security, raising challenges to position limits
and other restrictive rules. And again, it is largely an institutional
product, conferring benefits on one class of investors, simply not avail-
able to others.
To sum up: Derivatives pose today's great challenge to the financial
regulation we accept as immutable. They are the cause of the creak
one hears in the decades old structure of federal securities, commodi-
ties, and banking regulation. Since the derivative is a commercial ne-
cessity, regulators are pressed to limit regulation; broad-based or
centralized regulation of derivatives is therefore unlikely. On the
other hand, a foreseeable consequence of the acceptance of a different
regulatory regime for derivatives is the narrowing or even elimination
of heretofore important aspects of the regulation of markets and
products.
